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As democracy spreads, the importance of redistribution 
policies is believed to increase, bringing with them the threat of 
weakening incentives and slowing growth. Yet, to date the 
determinants of redistribution policies have rarely been investi- 
gated outside a few OECD countries and outside the context of 
narrowly defined transfer payments. This paper examines the 
determinants of a broader cl;~ss of redistribution policies, 
namely, the share of public spending on health, education and 
welfare in total government spending in a larger set of countries 
(a panel data set consisting of 105 countries) over the period 
1988 -2000. In particular. the paper views redistributive spending 
as  emanating from two global 1.-rends: cleregulation of interna- 
tional capital movenlents and the spread of democratic 
institutions. Our basic hypothesis is that because of the risks 
involved in international capital ]nobility and the fact that their 
use of standard macroeconomic policies is increasingly limited 
by international rules of the game, governments find redistribu- 
tive spending policies convenient tools for dealing with the 
distributive effects inherent in these risks, especially when 
financial crises actually occur. 'The results, with both fixed arid 
random effects models, support most of the: hypotheses, several 
of them quite strongly. 
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I. Introduction 
The last 20 years of economic and political history around the 
world have witnessed two notable trends: economic liberalization 
and the spread of democracy. Democratic institutions have come to 
every continent of the world and in some of these continents a 
sizable majority of the countries now have some degree of 
democracy. though in many cases that democracy is still quite 
fragile. At the same time, economic liberalization has proceeded, in 
some cases very slowly but  in others quite rapidly. While in some 
respects the two trends are reinforcing, in other ways they 
introduce new tensions that  citizenry and governments have been 
struggling to resolve. Nowhere is this tension stronger than in the 
relatively fragile democracies of developing countries that have both 
democratized and liberalized primarily only since the mid-1980s. 
Among the various forms of liberalization, the one that has  posed 
the greatest challenge in this respect would seem to be the 
liberalization of international capital flows. This is because with 
increasing globalization massive capital inflows or outflows can 
occur rapidly and can reverse direction unexpectedly. These flows. 
moreover, are often speculative in nature and hence subject to 
"herding behavior" and "rational expectations bubbles" that can 
destabilize exchange rates, interest rates and a country's level of 
economic activity in a very short period of time. With free capital 
mobility, moreover, monetary policy is ineffective under a regime of 
fixed exchange rates, and fiscal policy is ineffective under a flexible 
exchange rate regime. Thus, under either exchange rate regime, 
even a responsive democratic government may be quite limited in 
its ability to manage the large and sudden shocks that can arise 
with international capital mobility and thereby to protect the 
economic security of its citizens. Notably also, these shocks and 
financial crises have been rather common during this period of 
increasing capital mobility and democratization. The standard policy 
prescription for dealing with these shocks seems to have been the 
adoption of tight monetary policies, policies that seemingly have 
caused considerable economic hardship in the short run.1 
I While in some cases, the duration of these crises and painful economic 
policies has been quite short, the costs associated with the recent crises in 
emerging market economies have been substantial. For example, according 
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Yet somehow, many countries have managed to combine 
increasingly democratic  institution:^ with international openness to 
capital inflows and outflows. Indeed, democracy and capital 
openness (and its associated financial risks), are highly correlated. 
Indeed. the potential risks ;~ssociated with capital market 
liberalization would seem to demand that these risks be mitigated 
in some way. But, as  mentioned above, if liberalization has limited 
the ability of governments to manage thesr: risks through macro- 
economic policy, how can governments ;anti especially democratic 
governnlerlts deal with them? Based on the median voter model of 
democracies, our hypothesis is that democratic governments may 
attempt to mitigate these risks through redistributive fiscal policies. 
especially those on the expenditure side. Has this happened? Ha*, 
there been a greater tendency for capital-liberalizing countries, and 
especially democratic ones, to adopt redistribution policies'? If suc11 
a tendency has been realized, has it been accentuated or retarded 
by financi,al risks and crises? 
While there exist numerous st~11:lies relating financial opening to 
economic growth, financial liberalization to democracy and ine- 
quality to redistribution and growth, to the best of our knowledge. 
the relationship between liberalization of capital flows and incomcx 
redistribution has not been addxessed. For us  the relationship 
between financial openness and redistribution derives from thf: 
risks of financial crises that  financial openness implies. I t  may also 
depend on the way in which political leaders react to the risks. 
which, in turn, may depend on thr: character of the polity, e.g . ,  or1 
whether or not the median voter rriodel applies. 
To test the hypothesis we make use of pooled cross-sectional ant1 
time series data for a panel of 105 countries over the period 
1988-2000. This was the period in which the trends toward capital 
market liberalization and democracy were very noticeable but also 
associated with a number of largely unforeseen financial crises. Thc: 
analysis also makes use of indexes for financial openness, financial 
risks, crises and democracy to examine the extent to which these 
to Stiglitz and Bhattacharya (1999), unemploymenl doubled in Thailand and 
tripled in Korea over a year of the cnsis, while standards of living declined 
14% and 22%. In many cases the result has been substantial portions of 
the population falling under the poverty line, substantial reductions in real 
wages and increased unemployment (Baldacci. Mello, and Inchauste (2004) 
,tnd Sen (1'399)). 
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various indicators have contributed to the explanation of redistrib- 
utive spending policies. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 11, we briefly 
review some relevant literature, outline the theoretical foundations, 
and derive hypotheses relating financial openness, risks, crises and 
democracy to income redistribution effort. In Section 111, we present 
the data and some descriptive statistics on the variables and simple 
relationships among them. In Section IV we present our empirical 
results and in Section V our conclusions. 
11. Literature, Model and Hypotheses 
A. Some Relevant Antecedents 
One very important source of the interest in redistributive 
policies has been the keen controversy over the role of inequality in 
growth that arose in the early 1990s. It was in this period that the 
earlier notion that inequality would be beneficial for growth (in the 
sense that it would allow aggregate savings to be higher than 
would be possible for the same average income per capita with a 
more equal distribution) began to be challenged by a new view that 
inequality would lower growth. One of the mechanisms cited for 
this latter effect was that, especially in democratic settings, greater 
existing inequality would make the median voter a poor voter and 
thereby prompt her to back candidates with programs to 
redistribute income from rich to poor (Alesina and Kodrik 1994; 
Persson and Tabellini 1994: and Barro 2000). Since the taxes on 
the rich and transfers to the poor would worsen incentives for work 
and saving and raise dead-weight transaction cost losses. ineq~~ality 
would lower growth. But relatively little has been done to 
empirically verify this connection and what has been done has 
yielded rather mixed results (Benabou 1996). 
Another antecedent has  been the increasing attention to capital 
market liberalization as  one of the components of the "Washington 
Consensus" but then also of the increasing vulnerability of capital 
market liberalization to financial risks and crises. Some scholars 
( e . g . ,  Rodrik 1998) and international agencies have emphasized the 
need for liberalizing governments to develop social safety nets to 
protect vulnerable citizens against these risks. But again. have 
these safety nets been put in place? 
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A third but related antecedeni- is the empirical findirig that in 
financial crises, the most vulnerable individuals are often chi1drc:n 
of rather poor families who are taken out of school artd 
disproportionately deprived of good nutrition and access to heal..h 
care.2 Tl-lose with more educatiort and other assets are better able 
to absorb and adjust to these risks than those who are 1e:is 
well-endowed in these respects. This calls attention to the need for 
more and better services and programs to overcome these acce:js 
disparities during crises, not simply cash t~andouts and to viewirig 
investmemts in health and education of children as  means of 
reducing present and future vulnerability to such risks. 
A relevant theoretical perspective on the role of income re- 
distribution in the context of financial openness, it's associatc:d 
risks, artd democracy is that of constilutional political economy. 
Traditional welfare economics based on Pareto optimality had 
focused on efficiency anti aggregate welfare but gave little at.tentio1.1 
to redistribution as a positive policy strategy. By contrast, tlle 
literature on constitutior~al politjcal economy incorporates the role 
of institutions and the public choice process through which income 
redistribution can be implemented in a democratic society. Thus, 
from th1.s perspective, income redistribution can constitute a 
potentially important and legitirrtate means of responding to tlic 
risks of financial instability in i.he interest of social justice artd 
poverty reduction, and possibly also growth, and at  the same time 
to increa,sing the political feasibility of liberalization. 
We adopt the view of constitutional political economy and the 
assumption of a risk-averse median voter who in the face of risk 
and uncertainty prefers secured assets over income volatility. We 
employ the idea of an expected utility maximizing median voter 
with aversion to risk. Bishop, Formby, and Smith (1991) paved the 
groundwork for this idea. Risk-averse citizens consent to an 
involuntary redistribution because they view the redistribution as  
income iinsurance (Wessel 1993). Risk-averse citizens are willing to 
give up part of their income today to protect themselves and thvir 
children against the risk of becoming poor in the future (Olson 
'~ecaus,e  of very detailed, large sample surveys covering health and 
education before and after the financial cris~s of 1997 in Indonesia, tl9s 
findirig is especially well documented for Indonvsia. See especially Strauss 
ct c11. (2004) and references therein. 
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1987). 
Hence, economic volatility and insecurity related to financial 
openness may induce risk-averse voters to choose redistribution. In 
view of the special vulnerability of children to lack of access to 
health and education in financial crises, the median voter favors 
protection in the form of additional spending on public education, 
public health, and social security and welfare. Differing institutional 
conditions, however, such a s  varying degrees of democracy in 
different countries and over time might give rise to different 
influences on income redistribution efforts. 
This is consistent with a production function based largely or 
exclusively on human capital (h)yt=h( wherein human capital is 
determined by the following accumulation function: 
where h( is parental human capital a t  time t and El is public 
spending on education and health at  time t ,  and ti( is the income 
tax rate. 
Each generation in each household attempts to maximize the 
following utility function 
subject to 
and equations (1) and (2). 
Without formally introducing risk (since even in its present form 
the utility associated with h can be understood in terms of both its 
income-raising and risk-reducing properties) and without formally 
deriving our hypotheses, one can see how the problem can be 
simplified and simple hypotheses derived. For example, although 
the above maximization problem could be stated in terms of two 
policy choices, t,( and E(, by assuming a uniform income tax rate. 
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from (2) the choice can be reduced to a single one for H,. 
Intuitively and from the stylized fact mentioned above without 
going through the formal modrls some of which are already 
available in the existing literature, we state the followng 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Greater financial openness leads to greater income 
redistribution efforts through public spending on health, education 
and welfare. 
Hypothesis 2: An important channel through which financial 
openness induces greater income redistribution effort is through the 
realization of greater vulnerability Lo financial risk. 
Hypothesis 3: Taking Hypothesis 2 one step further, when the 
financial risk associated with financial openness actually results in 
crisis, thi:s channel for inducing greater redistribution effort is likely 
to be even greater. Hence. a courit.ry with high financial risk and a 
crisis should exercise greater income redistribution effort than a 
country with high financial risk but without a crisis. 
Hypothesis 4: Countries with more democratic institutions should 
be inclined to demand more redistribution effort for given levels of 
financial openness and financial risk because a poorer median votrr 
is likely to be more inclined to push for redistribution than a 
member of the elite. 
111. Measures, Data and Descriptive Analysis of Data 
A. Measurement of Income Redistribution Eflort 
Income redistribution can take various forms and come about by 
various means. In particular, it can take place by hiring poor 
people w ~ t h  very unstable incomes a t  higher and steadier wage 
rates or by taxing the rich and providing transfers to the poor. Bct 
often governments do not hire poor people and by no means are 
redistributive tax and transfer policies very common, especially in 
developing countries (Milanovic 19!39). In our opinion more lntended 
redistribution in more countries takes pl;lcr. through the character 
316 SEOUL JOURNAL O F  ECONOMICS 
of government spending, such a s  spending directed to public 
health, education and welfare programs. This is not to deny that. 
in practice a t  least, substantial portions of public health and 
education programs actually go to middle class and rich families 
who may be the preponderant group taking advantage of the 
sophisticated services of fancy hospitals and universities. Neverthe- 
less, even so, their allegedly positive effects on the ability of poor 
children and poor families to take advantage of the services 
provided often justify these kinds of expenditures. Hence, even if 
not truly redistributive, public spending on health, education and 
social security are widely perceived to be redistributive. For this 
reason, for our measure of effort to redistribute income by a 
government, we use the sum of public expenditures on health, 
education and social security as  a share of government expendi- 
tures. Time series data on the relative importance of redistributive 
spending are computed from the figures on such expenditures and 
on total government spending obtained from various issues of the 
International Monetary Fund's Government Financial Statistics 
Yearbook. We have been able to obtain this data for the years 1988 
to 2000 for 105 countries.3 
B. Measure of the Explanatory Variables 
Choosing an appropriate measure of financial openness is an 
admittedly controversial activity. The IMF Annual Reports on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions are the most 
common source of most of the indexes that have been constructed.4 
Because of its availability for our 105-country sample for the time 
period for which we have redistributive expenditures, we have 
chosen to use the index of Capital Account 1,iberalization 
constructed from that data by Chinn and Ito (2002). 
For our risk index, we make use of data from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). While ICRG provides data on various 
sources of risk, given our focus on the risk associated with 
3 For alternative measures, we also constructed the share of such 
expenditures in GDP but this measure was thought to reflect primarily the 
size of government. In our preliminary analysis the determinants of this 
measure of redistributive effort seemed quite similar. 
4 See. for example. Quinn and various co-authors (2000. 2001). Rodrik 
(1998). Levine and Zervos (1998). Edwards (2000). and Chinn and Ito 
(2002). Among them. Quinn's index is the founding work for the index. 
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deregulation of international capital flows. we make use only of iLs 
data on financial risk. This inde.x was constructed by considerillg 
total debt as  a percentage of GDP, debt service as  a percentage ~f 
exports of goods and services, the current account deficit as  a 
percentage total exports of gootls and services, the number 3s 
months of irnport cover provided by the existing stock 3f 
international reserves, and exchan,ge rate variability. 
For our democracy index we use the Freedom House county  
ratings (Freedom House 2003. 2004). Each country is assignchd 
ratings f13r both political rights and civll liberties derived in part 
Srorn the extent of the country's adherence to the IJniversal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The scores assigned are on a scale of 
1 to 7 .  with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom preselit 
and seven the lowest level of freedom. Each pair of political righls 
ancl civil liberties ratings is in turn averaged to obt.ain 0111- 
composite i~idex of democracy. Because of t.he way it is coded, with 
higher sscores representing couni.ries with less democrac:y, i t  is 
actually an inverse measure of detnocracy. 
Crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity alter the 
crisis and a value of 0 before the crisis. For the identification of a 
crisis year we make use of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) who 
identify t.he dates of crises and financial liberalization in a large 
nurnber of countries. 
Since countries a t  high levels ~:)f development may be more able 
to afford to spend more on heallh, education and welfare, we also 
include real GDP per capita (based on PPP prices) and urbanizaticln 
as  control variables for level of development. Data for these 
variables is taken from World Development Indicators and the Per111 
World Ta.bles (PWT 6.1). The first variable is also used to classify 
countries into high income, upper middle income, middle incon~e 
and low income countries based on the World Development 
Indicators. 
C. DescfiLptioe Analysis of Data 
Before undertaking our econometric estimation, we present some 
figures that serve to describe the data and motivate the further 
analysis by showing some simple relationships among the relevai~t 
variables 
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TABLE 1 
HYP~THETICAL ARGUMENTS BElWEEN ~ N A N C ~ A L  OPENNESS 
AND THE INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
- - 
Different arguments Various possibility of the outcomes 
Positive influence Financial Openness leads to economic 
growth and higher GDP per capita which 
should raise redistributive spending. 
- Risk-averse median voter will induce 
government to adopt redistributive 
spending in order to compensate for the 
greater risks, which the median voter is 
forced to bear due to financial openness. 
Negative influence Financial Openness leads to the weakness 
in the political power of working class. 
which may result in lower redistributive 
effort by government. 
Ambieuous influence Unclear other channel variables. 
Figure 1 shows the gradually rising share of redistributive 
spending in total government spending over the years 1988-2000. 
Figure 2 shows that  the trend in this share has been rising in 
both more democratic (high democracy) and (low democracy) less 
democratic countries. Yet the figure also shows that the share is 
much higher and rising more sharply in the more democratic 
countries. Figure 3 shows that the inverse measure of democracy is 
negatively related to the redistibutive spending share in total 
government spending. 
Figure 4 shows that financial openness has also been increasing 
over time in both more and less democratic countries. Once again. 
however. the values of the financial openness index are higher and 
more rapidly rising in the more democratic countries. Figure 5 
shows that there is at least a somewhat positive relationship 
between the score on the financial openness index and the share of 
redistibutive spending in total government spending. 
Figure 6 demonstrates that  the relationship between the financial 
risk scores and the redistributive spending scores is positive. Figure 
7 shows the relationship between these same redistibutive shares 
and per capita income also to be positive. Finally. Figures 8 and 9 
show that the average risk index rises with both income per capita 
and the degree of democracy. 
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FIGURE 1 
THE SHARE OF REDISTRIBUTIVE SPENDING 
IN TOTAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING (S) OVER TIME 
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FIGURE 2 
THE TREND IN THE SHARES OF F&DISTRIBUTIVE SPENDING I  TOTAL 
SPENDING I  HIGH DEMOCRACY AND LOW DEMOCRACY OUNTRIES 
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FIGURE 3 
THE RELATIONSHIP BE'IWEEN THE REDISTRIBUTIVE SPENDING SHARE 
AND THE INVERSE DEMOCRACY INDEX 
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FroURE 4 
THE FINANCIAL. OPENNESS INDEX OVER TIME 
FOR HIGH AND LOW DEMOCRACY OUNTRIES 
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FIGURE 7 
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IN TOTAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND INCOME PER CAPITA 
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FIGURE 8 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AVERAGE FINANCIAL RISKS 
AND INCOME PER CAPITA 
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FIGURE 9 
n-IE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL RISK AND DEMOCRACY 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
A. Simple Correlations 
The first step in our empirical analysis is to show the 
correlations among all the variables included in our analysis 
Figure 10 provides the matrix of scatter diagrams among thc 
variables included in our analysis. Table 2 provides the matrix oi 
correlation coefficients between each pair of variables (other than 
the dummy variables). 
As can easily be seen, the share of public redistributional 
spending in total government spending is positively related to the 
level of GDP in real terms, the index of financial openness, the 
index of financial risk and the share of urban population in the 
total population. It  is negatively related to inequality (as measured 
by the Gini coefficient for far fewer observations).s Note that several 
5 Because of the small number of available observations for Gini a s  2. 
measure of inequality, this variable is omitted from the subsequenl: 
econometric analysis. 
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S rgdpch fo cdi fr mi urban 
S 1 .oooo 
rgdpch 0.6481 1.0000 
fo 0.5158 0.6598 1 .OOOO 
cdi -0.4434 -0.6689 -0.3871 1.0000 
fr 0.5029 0.7473 0.4104 -0.4532 1.0000 
gini -0.6296 -0.7092 -0.6414 0.3294 -0.5897 1 .Om0 
urban 0.5485 0.6822 0.4242 -0.4415 0.4655 -0.4433 1.0000 
FIGURE 10 
MATRIX OF SCAT~ER DIAGRAMS AMONG VARIABLES 
of the explanatory variables are quite highly correlated with each 
other, implying that regression results may be subject to estimation 
biases arising from collinearity.6 For this reason, we deem it 
%is  is especially true for the correlations involving the level of real GDP 
per capita. This variable has positive correlation coefficients above 0.65 with 
financial openness, financial risk. democracy and urban. 
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important to employ a number of different specificat.ions of 
explanatory variables to determine the robustness of the results to 
different specifications. 
B. Econometric Models 
In order to test the hypotheses presented above, we use the 
following model for the share of redistibutive spending in total 
government expenditures (S) in coi.intry i and year t 
Xzit is financial openness index. 
9 
X:3it is a set of macroeconomic col-itrol variables such a s  per capita 
real GDP and urbanization. 
X4il is a set of hypothesized channel variables such as  financial 
risks. crisis and democracy. 
The modlel is estimated with panel data for the sample of 105 
countries for the years 1988-2000 using panel data methods. We 
use both fixed and random effects; and then compare the two sets 
of results and apply the Hausman test to help us  choose between 
the two models. 
If the specification is correct, we can interpret the results of the 
model as identifying the channels through which financial opennes,s 
exerts its effects on income redisl.ribution effort. Given the identity 
of the variables included in XU and the different indicators 
included in the ICRG composite index for financial risk, these 
include the overall budget balance:, debt senrice, exchange rate and 
the real interest rate as well a s  crisis and democracy. 
What should we expect from the panel estimation? (1) From 
H ~ p o t h e s ~ s  1 we should expect a positive and significant influence 
of financial openness on the share of redistributive spending in 
total government spending. (2) Once we control for the mac- 
roeconomic and channel variables, XW and XW respectively, are 
would expect the size and significance of the effect of financial 
openness on redistributive spending to decline. This is because tke 
channel variables would be capturing the effects of financial 
openness coming indirectly through t l~ese variables. (3) From 
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TABLE 3
PANEL REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE DETERMINANTS 
OF THE SHARE OF REDISTRIBUTIVE SPENDING 
IN TOTAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING (S)  BASED ON FIXED E m c r s  
Independent 
Variables (1) (21 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Financial 1.36- 0.99- 0.65. 0.48 0.48 0.82.. 0.49 0.41 
Openness (0.OOO) (0.004) (0.093) (0.20) (0.21) (0.0351 (0.201 
Log (per capita 12.54** 10.67" 8.6gH* 8.69'- 8.8gH* 6.3" 






of Risk and Crisis 
Urbanization 0.45- 0.47- 
Ratio (0.01) 
Notes: ***: at 1%. **: at 5%. and *: at 10% significance level. ( ) are p-values. 
Hypothesis 2 we should expect the effect of financial risk on the 
income redistribution to be positive and significant. (4) Because the 
effect of financial risk on redistributive spending should be greater 
when a crisis occurs (Hypothesis 3), we should expect the effect of 
the interaction term between crisis and financial risk to be positive. 
(5) From hypothesis 4 we should expect a negative effect of the 
inverse of democracy measure on the share of redistributive 
spending in total government spending. 
Table 3 presents the results of the panel estimation with fixed 
effects for nine different specifications of the variables included in 
the model. The specification in column (1) includes only the 
financial openness variable; that in column (2) adds the control 
variable for per capita income. Those in columns (3)-(5) 
progressively add channel variables, first hancia l  risk, then the 
crisis dummy variable and ha l ly  the inverse democracy index, and 
the additional control for level of development, urbanhation. 
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TABLE 4 
PANEL REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE DETERMINANTS 
OF THE SHARE OF REDISTRIBUTIVE SPENDING 
I N  TUTAI, GOVERNMENT SPENDING (S) BASED ON RANDOM EFFECTS 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Financial I.%*** 1.07'- 0.74" 0.58 0.64' I *  0.59 0.64' 
Openness (0.1 1) (0.1 1) 
Log (per capita 9.35** 8.64"' 8.24** 5.4 I *** 8.28"' 7.53*"* 
real GDP) 
Financial Risk 0.16"' 0.15"' 0.15**' 0.29"' 0.25"' 0.15"' 0.16"' 




of Risk and Crisis 
Urbanization 0.14" 0.15** 
Ratio 
Column (61 includes only the financial risk index: column (7) adds 
the financial openness index. The specification in column (8) is the 
same as that in column (3) but adds the interaction term between 
financial risk and crisis. The specification in column (9) is similar 
but includes also both the inverse democracy index and the. 
urbanization index. 
Table 4 presents the results for each of the same specifications 
as  in Table 3 but estimated with a random effects model, 
Application of the Hausman test, shows that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the 
two models. 
For this reason we discuss the results collectively. First. there if; 
fairly strong evidence from both sets of results in favor of 
Hypothesis 1. Indeed, the coefficient of financial openness on 
redistributive spending is positive in every case and significant as: 
the ten percent level or better in 9 of the 16 specifications in 
which this variable is included. In two others it is significant a t  the 
I 1 percent level. 
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As shown in the second row of each table, the level of 
development (measured by per capita GDP) has a positive and 
highly significant effect on redistributive spending. This confirms 
the importance of introducing this variable as a control. 
Urbanization, in the last row plays a similar role as it., too, has a 
positive and significant effect when introduced a s  in columns (5) 
and (9) when either fixed or random effects are used. Since the 
level of development is also positively related to financial openness, 
it is not surprising that the size of the coefficient of financial 
openness declines when these variables are included. 
Under both fixed effects and random effects, the estimated values 
of the coefficient of financial risk on redistributive spending are 
positive arid significant a t  the one percent level in all but one case. 
The exception, moreover, is column (9) of Table 3 where, in 
addition to financial risk there is an interaction term between 
financial risk and crisis, the coefficient of is positive and significant 
a t  the one percent level. Moreover since, the addition of financial 
risk to the model invariably has the effect of reducing the value of 
the coefficient of financial openness, it is clear that the results 
strongly confirm hypothesis 2 (that financial risk serves a s  an 
important channel for the realization of the effect of financial 
openness on redistribution effort by the government). 
Similarly, note from the row of entries for the Crisis Dummy that 
the financial crisis variable also has a positive and significant effect 
on redistributive spending in the two specifications (columns (4) 
and (5)) in which it is included. Moreover, its inclusion in the 
model further reduces the magnitude of the direct impact of 
financial openness in the same relationship (in both the fixed and 
random effects models). These results support Hypothesis 3, 
namely, that Crisis is another channel whereby financial openness 
exercises an indirect effect on redistibutive spending. 
The facts that the coefficient of the financial risk-crisis 
interaction term is positive and significant a t  the one percent level 
in both Tables 3 and 4, and that its introduction further weakens 
the direct impact of financial openness, show that the indirect 
effects of financial openness through both financial risk and crisis 
may be considerably more important than the direct effect. 
The one result that, a t  first glance a t  least, goes against our 
hypotheses, is the insignificant effect of the inverse measure of 
democracy in columns ( 5 )  and (9) of Table 3.  The coefficient is even 
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positive which goes against our h!,pothesis (4) in which we expecttd 
that democracy would have a positive effect on redistributive 
spending (i.e.. a negative effect. of the inverse measure of dl:- 
mocracy). However, since the variation in the inverse tlemocrac:y 
index is primarily across countrit:~, this rrkeans that in this table 
the cross section influence of democracy on redistribution is being 
picked ujp by country fixed effect!;. When random effects are used 
as  in Table 4, the coefficients of the inverse democrac:~ index 
become negative and in one case it is statistically significant so t11e 
result may not be a s  disappointing a?; a t  first it would seern. 
Another :reason for the somewhat disappointing result with respert 
to democracy may be that, during the period covered, t11e 
democracy measure was quite high in most countries. Therefor:. 
one wou1.d have to go back to somewhat earlier years than our 
starting point 1988 to have a good chance of detecting t11e 
influence of democracy on redistribution effbrt. Note, however, that, 
from Figure 1, on average, countries classified as  more tlemocratic 
had significantly higher shares of redist.ril:~utive spending in to t ,~ l  
government spending. 
V. Conclusion 
Recent developments have made it clear that liberalizations (of 
various sorts, but especially of international capital movements, can 
lead to increased financial risks and the likelihood of crises. In 
such crises it is often people with low levels of human capit.31 
including the children of the poor who are most severely 
disadvantaged. 
Consistent with the constitutional political economy school, ure 
have argued that in such cil-cumstances, and especially in 
democratic countries, the risk-averse median voter will rationally 
induce her leaders to undertake redistributive efforts to protect her 
against the risks associated with financial liberalization. We ha1.e 
further argued that these redistibutive efforts could be expected to 
take the form of public expenditures on public health, education 
and welfare. Based on an  underlying theoretical structure a s  wcll 
as  existing stylized facts we have put forward four hypothesc~s 
concer11in.g the determinants of redistributive spending relative to 
total government spending and Il-ien tested these hypotheses witti 
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panel data on 105 countries over the period 1988-2000. 
Our empirical results show that, while greater financial openness 
is associated with relatively larger redistributive government 
spending, a s  additional controls (other variables of relevance to 
such spending) are added, the estimated effect of financial 
openness tends to decline. At the same time, however, in the case 
of our direct measure of financial risk, there is no tendency for 
this effect to be diluted as more controls are added. This finding is 
consistent with the implication of our risk-averse median voter 
model that financial risk should induce greater fiscal efforts to 
redistribute income in line with the interest of the median voter. 
Greater financial openness leads to greater income redistribution 
efforts. Greater financial risks are also significantly positively and 
significantly related to greater income redistribution efforts. A 
country with both higher financial risk indexes and a crisis 
undertakes more income redistribution effort than a country with 
just higher risk financial risk indexes. Regardless of the level of 
development, financial openness and financial risk, democratic 
countries experience somewhat but not generally significantly larger 
income redistribution efforts than non-democratic ones. 
Thus all four hypotheses are verified with this panel data 
analysis, the first three much more strongly than the fourth. But 
certainly the findings should be subjected to additional robustness 
checks such as  to the inclusion of additional controls and the use 
of alternative measures of redistributive spending (such a s  the 
inclusion of public employment). For example, it might be desirable 
to relax our assumption that all public expenditures on health and 
education are redistributive by carefully pulling out of the existing 
measure those public expenditures on universities and high cost 
medical services for the rich and then re-running the analysis. 
Similarly, alternative measures of the various indexes of explanatory 
variables, such as  of capital liberalization, financial risk and 
democracy, could be used and sensitivity analysis on their use 
performed. 7 
Aside from this, the present effort could be extended in a 
number of desirable ways. First, it would be desirable to extend the 
data set and its analysis backward in time, at  least to the 1970s. 
7 In the case of democracy, it would be highly desirable to use an  index 
that would reflect greater variation over time. 
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This would be advantageous because the 1970s also witnessed 
numerous financial crises but in some cases with less openness to 
capital ~novements and with less democracy than in the m0r.e 
recent years. For this reason the collinearity problems might be 
reduced. Also, a s  mentioned above, this would have the effect of 
providing among other things greater variability over time in the 
democrac:y index. At the present time, a deterrent to doing this is 
the lack of comparable data on financial risk and crises before 
1988. But, in principle, it should be possible to extend this and 
other dat.a backwards even if one should have to make use of  
alternative data sources, thereby possibly limiting comparability 
over time. If this could be done, would the same effects of risk. 
and openness on redistribution be observed? 
Once the time series coverage could be extended so as  t.o provide 
a larger sample, it should become feasible to utilize data in lower 
frequencies without limiting the n1.1mber ctf observations too greatly. 
For example, instead of annual observations a s  we have used herc:. 
we could then use data averaged over five year periods. Would the 
estimated effects of deregulation of' international capital movement:;. 
crises anti risk on redistibutive public spending be larger or smaller 
with such lower frequency data than suggested by the estimates 
reported in t.his paper? 
Third, it would be useful to introduce additional cont.rols for 
exchange rate regimes, the degree of checks and balances in t.he 
political system and perhaps other factors. Furthermore, both these 
variables and others already included in the analysis could be used 
interactively with other variables. For example, would the effects of 
crisis and risk indicators on redistributive spending be greater for 
countries with fixed exchange rate regimes than for those with 
flexible exchange rates? Similarly, would the effects of the same 
variables be greater for countries with more checks and balances 
across the different components of government than for others wit.3 
fewer chelcks and balances? 
Finally, since the original concern for redistributive policies was 
due to its allegedly harmful effects on growth, another u s e f ~ ~ l  
extension would be to examine the effects on growth of our 
measure of redistributive spending. Whereas inequality data cannot 
be obtain.ed on an annual basis for even a smaller number of 
countries in the sample, for five-year periocls. it might be possible 
to obtain such data for a reasonable number of countries in the 
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sample. Hence, in this case, we would want to use the lower 
frequency data (for periods of five or more years) to examine the 
effect of redistributive spending averaged over such a period on the 
rate of growth of over the same period. Granger causality tests with 
alternating lags moreover could be run to determine the direction of 
causality in such relationships with the panel data. Also, it would 
be interesting to determine whether the effect of redistributive 
spending on growth might differ depending on whether or not the 
redistributive spending was up  to a level that might be "justified 
by" the extra financial risk derived from deregulation of inter- 
national capital movements. For example, it might be hypothesized 
that redistibutive spending up to the "risk-justified'' level would 
have no adverse effect on growth whereas redistributive spending 
beyond that level would have a negative effect. 
(Received 4 November 2004: Revised 8 November 2004) 
References 
Alesina, Alberto, and Dani, Rodrik. "Distributive Politics and 
Economic Growth." Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (No. 2 
1994): 465-90. 
Baldacci, Emanuele, Luiz, Mello, and Gabriela, Inchauste. Financial 
Crises, Poverty, and Income Distribution. Washington, D.C. : 
International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper. 2004. 
Barro, Robert. "Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries." 
Journal of Economic Growth 5 (No. 1 2000): 5-32. 
Benabou. R. "Inequality and Growth." In NBER Macroeconomic 
Annual. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 1-74, 1996. 
Bishop, John. Formby, John, and Smith, W. James. "Incomplete 
Information, Income Distribution and Risk Averse Median 
Voter Behavior." Public Choice 68 (Nos. 1-2 1991): 41-55. 
Chinn, Dennis, and Ito. Hiro. Capital Account Liberalization, Insti- 
tutions and Financial Development: Cross Country Evidence. 
USC Development Seminar, 2002. 
Dailami, Mansoor. Financial Openness, Democracy, and Redistribu- 
tive Policy. World Bank Working Paper, 2000. 
Edwards, Sebastian. Capital Mobility and Economic Performance: 
Are Emerging Economies Different? NBER Working Paper No. 
CAPITAL MOBILITY, FINANCIAL RISK, INSTITUTIONS 333 
8076. 2000. 
Fra.tzscher, Marchel, and Matthi~::~, Bussiere. Financial 0penne:ss 
and Growth: Short-Run Gain, Lmng-Run Gain. European 
Central Bank. Working Papc:r. 2004. 
Freedom House. Freedom in 11-!e World Country Ratings 19;'2 
through 2003. 2004. 
Hausmari. Jerry A. "Specification Tests in Econometrics." Eco- 
nomelrics 46 (No. 6 1978): 1251-71. 
International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Slatistt:~ 
Yearbook. Washington. D.C:.; IMF, Various Years. 
Kaminsk:y, Graciela, and Carmen. Reinhart.. "The Twin Crises: thr 
Causes of Banking and Balance of Payments Problen~." 
American Economic Review 89 (No. 3 1999): 473-500. 
Levine. Lass, and Zervos, Sara. "Capital Control Liberalization arid 
Stock Market Development ." World Development 26 (August 
1998): 766-84. 
Milanovic, Hranko. Do More Uneclual Countries Redistribute Marl-? 
Does the Median Voter Hypothesis I-lold? Washington, El.(:.: 
World Bank, Working Pape:r. 1999. 
Olsen. MLancur. "Why Some Welfare State IZedistribution Is a Grcat 
Idea." In Charles K. Rovrrley (ed.), Democracy and Pub!ic 
Choice: Essays in Honor of Cordon Ti~llock. Oxford. Hlackwe11, 
pp, 191-222. 1987. 
Persson, Thorsten, and Guido, 7';~tbellini. "Is Inequality Harmful for 
Growth?" American Econon-tic Reuieul 84 (No. 3 19941: 600 
-2 1. 
Prasad. E., Rogoff. Kenneth. S1-1a.g-Jiri, Wei, and Kose, M. A. 
Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countric?~: 
Some Empirical Evidence. Washington. D.C.: IMF, 2003. 
Quinn. ;Dennis, and Wooley, John. Democracy and International 
Fi:nancial Liberalization. American Political Science Associa- 
tion Conference, 2000. 
. "Democracy and National Economic Performance." 
Arnerican Journal of Politica.1 Science 45 (No. 3 2001): 634-57. 
Quinn. :Dennis, and Wooley, John, and Inclan, Carla. How and 
Where Capital Account Liberalization Leads to Econondc 
Growth. American Political Science Association Conference 
Paper. 200 1. 
Kodrik. Dani. "Why 110 More Open ECconomies Have Hi&;er 
Governments." Journal of F1olitical Economy 106 (No. 5 19981: 
334 SEOUL JOURNAL O F  ECONOMICS 
997- 1032. 
Sen, Amartya K. Global Justice: Beyond International Equity. New 
York, London: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Bhattacharya, Amar. Underpinnings for a 
Stable and Equitable Global Financial System from Old 
Debates to a New Paradigm. Paper Prepared for the Eleventh 
Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, April 
28-30. Washington, D.C.: 1999. 
Strauss, John, Kathleen, Beegle, Agus, Dwiyanto, Yulia, Herawati, 
Daan, Pattinasarany, Satriawan, Bondan, Sikoki. Sukamdi, 
and Firman, Witoelar. Indonesian Living Standards Before 
and after the Financial Crisis. Santa Monica: Rand and 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004. 
Wessel, J .  H. "Redistribution from a Constitutional Perspective. " 
Constitutional Political Economy 4 (NO. 3 1993): 425-48. 
World Bank. World Development Indicators 2003. 2003. 
